Building Safety Case White Paper

Aim

In this paper we aim to clarify what a safety case is, draw on lessons from other industries and suggest ways it can be applied successfully within the building sector.

Background

The Building Safety Act 2022, introduced after the Grenfell tragedy and subsequent inquiry, represents the biggest overhaul of building and fire safety regulation in a generation, the aim of which is to transform the built environment and the culture of those who shape and nurture it.[1]

Pivotal moments in other industries including the 1986 Challenger space shuttle accident for NASA, the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster for the UK offshore oil and gas industry and the 2006 Nimrod accident in Afghanistan for UK Defence Aviation precipitated similar sweeping changes to that of Grenfell, not just within the sector affected but across a broad spectrum of high risk industries.

As an example, the unearthing of deep, systemic failings within UK military aviation during the public inquiry into the RAF Nimrod accident led by Sir Charles Haddon-Cave KC[2], resonated across many other industries. Subsequently, the findings of the inquiry have been hugely influential in cross industry development of safety case methodology, to the extent that they were incorporated into the continuous improvement of safety case development processes used by the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).[3]

Of the far-reaching changes precipitated by the ‘Nimrod Review’, the legal requirement for every air system to have a robust safety case to demonstrate it is safe to operate and can be operated safely in a defined role and operating environment is of particular interest to the housing sector. The parallels with the safety case regime introduced as part of the BSA 22 are striking.

The Government commissioned Dame Judith Hackitt to review building regulations and fire safety after Grenfell. She declared that the system of regulation for Higher Risk Buildings (HRBs) was “not fit for purpose, leaving room for those who want to take shortcuts to do so” [4]. More specifically, the Hackitt Report echoed that of Haddon-Cave in proposing a new regulatory framework for the construction and through-life management of high-rise buildings, incorporating the requirement to produce a safety case for every HRB.

New Regulation

The Building Safety Act 2022 enshrines the overarching, strategic principle of the UK Health and Safety System, that those who create risks have a responsibility to manage them and action should be proportionate to the risks that need managing.[5] 

The Building Safety act demands that:

An accountable person for an occupied higher-risk building must take all reasonable steps for the following purposes—

(a) preventing a building safety risk materialising as regards the part of the building for which they are responsible;

(b) reducing the severity of any incident resulting from such a risk materialising.[6]

This regulatory approach is known as Goal Based Regulation, a defining characteristic of which is the lack of prescription. Goals are usually described as a series of broad principles, outcomes or standards that the regulated community must seek to achieve or satisfy.

The theory goes that when Accountable Persons are given autonomy or agency, they will think more carefully about how the objective can best be achieved with regard to their specific circumstances. Whilst some argue that the disadvantage of GBR is its relative inflexibility and consequent predictability, [7] our experience shows that a goals-based approach encourages APs to seek better and more innovative methods of achieving a regulatory goal which facilitates technological innovation. By avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach, the regulator has the freedom to reward organisations with a good compliance history. Furthermore, it should encourage APs to think more carefully about how best to achieve a particular regulatory goal and not to simply and mechanistically follow (or avoid through technical loopholes) the rules that have been laid out by the regulator.

The BSR will not (and in our opinion should not) define how an organisation should satisfy the regulation by providing document templates, for example. It is well recognised that best practice regulation is developed by the regulated community, not the regulator themselves. 

In the words of a former CEO of the UK Financial Services Authority the potential impact of the GBR approach on mindset is that it: “...helps emphasise that what really matters is not that any particular box has been ticked but rather that when making decisions, executives will know that they will be judged on the consequences – the results of those actions”. [8]

Set against a goals-based legislative framework, the safety case represents a highly suitable means of managing safety and demonstrating compliance with regulation.

The BSR’s Strategic Plan states that “Accountable Persons will be required to identify and assess building safety risks and take all reasonable steps to ensure those risks are mitigated and controlled to a proportionate level on an ongoing basis.” Indeed, as Principal Accountable Persons (PAP) will be aware, from 1 Oct 23, they are legally responsible for the safety of an occupied higher-risk building and are required to prepare a building safety case report.[9] 

Guidance published on 19 Sep 23 expands on the primary legislation, saying “The safety case report is a document that summarises the safety case for a high-rise residential building. It identifies the building’s safety risks and explains how the risks are being managed.”[10]

What is a safety case?

We at RiskFlag are often asked for a definition of a safety case. Firstly, it is important to make the distinction between the two terms, “safety case” and “safety case report”. Government guidance titled “Responsibilities of accountable persons for a building’s safety case” states that “…the building’s safety case is used to manage the risk of the spread of fire or structural failure. The principal accountable person must use the safety case to prepare a safety case report.” [11]

Furthermore, the BSR’s Strategic Plan states that the information necessary to demonstrate all reasonable steps have been taken will be contained in a ‘Safety Case’. Its definition of a ‘Safety Case Report’ is a summary of this information which will demonstrate to the Building Safety Regulator how the Accountable Persons are meeting their duties.” [12]

Dr Tim Kelly has written widely on the subject of safety cases and offers a useful description: “A safety case should communicate a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument that a system is acceptably safe to operate in a particular context.”[13]Extrapolating for a building safety case, it can be expressed as “a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensive and valid case that a building is safe for occupation in a given context.” 

Context here is essential. Kelly contends that context-free safety is impossible to argue. Almost any system can be unsafe if used in an inappropriate or unexpected manner. (He asks us to consider arguing the safety of a conventional house-brick.) It is a crucial part of the job of the safety case to define the context within which safety is to be argued.[14] In the case of the HRB, the context varies with construction methods and materials, its residents and its location, meaning every safety case will be different.

Safety cases are commonplace in industries across the globe. The AWE has been required to produce safety cases since 1997. Inevitably the way in which its safety cases are developed and used has matured over the years, yet it still believes it is in an organisation’s interest to have an efficient and effective safety case process, not simply to avert disaster but to assess and manage its risks, both in terms of safety and the broader business perspective.[15]

The RiskFlag safety case module uses a Claim – Argument - Evidence structure to develop the persuasive case that all reasonable steps have been taken to mitigate building safety risks. The safety case is an ever evolving artefact from which accurate assumptions and conclusions about the safety of the building can be drawn and we consider a safety case report to be a summary of the wider safety case. A single report does not constitute a safety case: once printed it will be out of date. Wilkinson clearly states that “in practice there can be few, if any safety cases, which can be regarded as complete.”[16] 

He also discusses how to get the level of detail right when producing a safety case for more than one “customer”. Customers in this case might include the BSR, residents, accountable persons, managing agents and other stakeholders with an interest in the safety of the building. Part of the problem stems from the need to produce a document that must contain sufficient detail for the regulator to be able to judge whether the case for safety has been made. However, the more detail the case contains, the larger the document becomes and the safety case runs the risk of being less useful to the people managing the building. Clearly a balance has to be struck; Wilkinson cites examples of organisations solving this dilemma but  developing “electronic” safety cases to help users “navigate” their way around the documents.[17]

Safety Culture

Whilst lessons learned from shock events such as those cited at the start of this paper are often applied through the evolution of health and safety legislation, it seems that cultural change often only permeates through a specific sector when the upheaval happens close to home. The intention of this paper is not to delve into understanding human psychology but it should be understood that fundamental changes in safety regulation must be underpinned by a foundation of culture.

Establishing and maturing a safety culture takes considerable time and effort and is continuously evolving. It has been described as the bedrock upon which all else depends, an analogy that is helpful in characterising culture as something that is deeply held and difficult to see.[18] For example, a recommendation from the Nimrod review was to establish an independent regulator. The Military Aviation Authority (MAA) was established in 2009 but it took another 7 years for Defence to recognise that safety applies to all activities (Land, maritime etc) and set up the Defence Safety Authority.

The development of a safety culture, built around the safety case can support a holistic view of building safety. A feature of the building sector we have noticed is the departmental siloes within organisations that often inhibit joined up safety thinking. In her report “Building a Safer Future” Dame Judith Hackitt uses the word “holistic” 14 times and recommends a ‘whole building safety’ approach that takes a proactive, holistic view of building safety across the entire building, through all phases of design, build, occupation and maintenance.[19] It means that all interaction with the building from major upgrades, to the installation of PV panels, to ongoing repairs should be assessed for their impact on the safety of the building. 

This approach is supported in guidance published by the HSE in Sep 23 that states “if your building undergoes any changes or refurbishment, you should check that they do not affect building safety, both in the refurbished parts of the building and in the building overall.”[20]

The HSE goes on to stress the importance of having systems in place to identify the impact of changes on building safety risks at the design, implementation and completion stages. We argue this is the role of the safety case. Rather than being a regulatory box-ticking exercise, the safety case becomes the mechanism through which “whole Building Safety” is achieved, through the life of the building.

At RiskFlag, we also advocate for the widest possible involvement in the development and ongoing management of the safety case. Sir Charles Haddon-Cave[21]stressed in his report that a good safety process involves the users of the system in question (in this case the building is the system). He believes that stakeholder involvement is crucial to the effective application of safety cases.

It is therefore in the interest of PAPs that the process by which safety cases are developed, reviewed and approved is sufficiently robust, and involve the right people who understand the building. Being able to demonstrate this robustness gives confidence to stakeholders, including the regulator and residents, that the PAP is capable of managing risk.

Conclusion

Regulation coming into force on 1 April 2024 makes it a legal requirement for all HRBs to be supported by a safety case. Whilst we recognise this presents a significant upheaval for most organisations, the benefits are considerable. Experience has shown us that the main benefit of a safety case comes from the process that the Accountable Person has to go through to prepare it. We contend that it is not the suite of documents that support the safety case that should be seen as the greatest benefit of the new safety case regulations, rather it is the process of preparing it, and the improvements in the building and managerial arrangements that are identified.

We are seeing that for many Accountable Persons, it is the first time the building has been systematically analysed to understand how it was designed, built and managed. Wilkinson[22] argues that “Preparing and reviewing safety cases provides both the driving force and framework by which areas of improvement can be identified and assessed, and programmes of action prepared.” We are also seeing an improvement in safety management systems (SMS) and in some cases, these are being formalised for the first time.

Using our knowledge and experience of safety cases we have designed a bespoke, user-friendly building safety case platform to help you benefit from the safety case process at the same time as meeting the intent of the regulation. If you wish to know more about how we can help you, please get in touch at info@RiskFlag.com.

[1] Building Safety Regulator Strategic Plan 2023-26. p.3

[2] Haddon-Cave, C., (2009) An independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006

[3] Murphy, K.R. et al, (2012) How reliable is my safety case? pp.395

[4] Hackitt, J. (2018) Building a Safer Future – Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report p.5

[5]HSE, (2024) Strategy, Policy and legal framework. https://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/strategy-policy-legal.htm

[6]Department for Levelling up, Housing and Communities, (2022) Building Safety Act 2022, Section 84

[7]Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, (2018) Goals-based and rules based approaches to regulation, BEIS Research Paper Number 8 (London) p.13

[8] Sants, H. (2009). “Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence” Speech delivered to the Reuters Newsmakers Event, 12 March 2009.

[9] Department for Levelling up, Housing and Communities, (2022) Building Safety Act 2022, Section 85

[10] Health and Safety Executive, (2023), Guidance - Preparing a Safety Case Report.

[11] Health and Safety Executive, (2023), Guidance - Safety Case for a high-rise residential building

[12] Building Safety Regulator Strategic Plan 2023-26. p.18

[13]Kelly, T, (2003), A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Management, SAE Technical Paper Series (SAE International, UK, 04AE-149) p.1

[14]Ibid, p.2

[15] Murphy, K.R. et al, (2012) How reliable is my safety case? pp.392

[16] Wilkinson, P., (2002), Safety Cases: Success or Failure? Seminar Paper 2, (Australia, The Australian National University) p.7

[17]Ibid. p.9

[18] Murphy, K.R. et al, (2012) How reliable is my safety case?pp.393

[19]Hackitt, J. (2018) Building a Safer Future – Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report p.59

[20] Health and Safety Executive, (2023), Guidance - Managing safety risks in high-rise residential buildings: a detailed guide

[21]Haddon-Cave, C., (2009) An independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006. P.546

[22]Wilkinson, P., (2002), Safety Cases: Success or Failure? Seminar Paper 2, (Australia, The Australian National University) p.7

Bishop, P., Bloomfield, R. (1998). A Methodology for Safety Case Development. In: Redmill, F., Anderson, T. (eds) Industrial Perspectives of Safety-critical Systems. (Springer, London).

Defence Safety Authority, (2023), Manual of Air System Safety Cases, Issue 3 (Bristol, UK)

Department for Levelling up, Housing and Communities, (2022) Building Safety Act 2022, (London)

Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, (2018) Goals-based and rules based approaches to regulation, BEIS Research Paper Number 8 (London)

Hackitt, J, (2018), Building a Safer Future – Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety: Final Report, (London, HMSO, Cm9607)

Haddon-Cave, C., (2009), An independent review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006, Ordered by the House of Commons (London: The Stationery Office, ref HC 1025)

Health and Safety Executive, Building Safety Regulator Strategic Plan 2023-26, https://www.hse.gov.uk/building-safety/assets/docs/strategic-plan.pdf [20 Dec 23]

Health and Safety Executive, (2024) Strategy, Policy and legal framework. https://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/strategy-policy-legal.htm [20 Dec 23]

Health and Safety Executive, (2023), Preparing a Safety Case Report. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/preparing-a-safety-case-report

Health and Safety Executive, (2023), Guidance - Safety Case for a high-rise residential building https://www.gov.uk/guidance/safety-case-for-a-high-rise-residential-building

Health and Safety Executive, (2023), Guidance - Managing safety risks in high-rise residential buildings: a detailed guide. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-safety-guides-for-accountable-persons/managing-safety-risks-in-high-rise-residential-buildings-a-detailed-guide

Kelly, T. (2003), A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Management, SAE Technical Paper Series (SAE International, UK, 04AE-149)

Leveson, N., (2011) The Use of Safety Cases in Certification and Regulation Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, Working Paper Series 2011-13 (Massachusetts, USA)

Murphy, K.R., Gilbert, S.M., Lewis, B., (2012) “How reliable is my safety case?”, IChemE, Hazards XXIII, Symposium Series No.158, (392-398)

Sants, H. (2009). “Delivering Intensive Supervision and Credible Deterrence” Speech delivered to the Reuters Newsmakers Event, 12 March 2009

Wilkinson, P., (2002), Safety Cases: Success or Failure? Seminar Paper 2, (Australia, The Australian National University).

Wilson, S.P., Kelly, T.P., McDermid, J.A. (1997). Safety Case Development: Current Practice, Future Prospects. In: Shaw, R. (eds) Safety and Reliability of Software Based Systems. (London, Springer).